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[ VOL. 42

AccELEraTAm JUDGMENT

CPLR 3211(e): Motion under 3211 (a) (7) allowed before answer
although another 3211(a) motion is pending.
While ostensibly the CPLR holds- non-waivable an objection
under 3211(a) (7) that a complaint fails to state a cause of action,"
debate has arisen as to whether such an objection may be raised
by motion prior to answer while another 3211(a) motion is pending. Some authors have contended
that a second motion may
68
not be made prior to answer.
In contrast, however, is Higby Enterprises, Inc. v. City of
Utica.69 There the defendant moved, with 3211(a) (7) as authority, for a dismissal on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to
state a cause of action. At the time the motion was made, another of defendant's motions to dismiss the action under 3211(a)
was pending before the court. The court held that the latter
motion was not barred by the prior one, and remarked that "the
defendant . . . may have set forth this defense in its answer or

may, at its own option, make a motion under CPLR 3211 at any
time." 70
Resolution of the multi-motion problem raised by 3211 (a) (7)
will necessarily involve a construction of the words "any subsequent time" contained in CPLR 3211(e). That subsection seeks to
prevent dilatory tactics in the prosecution of a cause of action by
71
providing for an omnibus motion to be made prior to answer.
As originally drafted, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action could be made only after answer, and would be
treated as a motion for summary judgment.72 However, the final
compromise version of subdivision (e) allowed for a 3211(a) (7)
motion to be made either prior or subsequent to answer. It is
67 CPLR 3211(e) states that an objection based upon the grounds set
forth in 3211(a)(1), (3), (4), (5), and (6) is waived unless raised by
motion or in the responsive pleading. Further, an objection based on the
grounds contained in 3211(a)(8) and (9) is waived if not raised in a
3211(a) motion or in the responsive pleading, whichever comes first. Thus,
by elimination, an objection under 3211(a)(7), and also objections under
3211(a)(2) and (10), are readily discerned as non-waivable. A like rule
prevailed under the CPA. For example, in Booth v. Carleton Co., 236
App. Div. 296, 258 N.Y.S. 159 (1st Dep't 1932), it was noted that "a
motion objecting to the complaint because it does not state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action may be made at any time before trial or
at the trial." Id. at 298, 258 N.Y.S. at 162.
684 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MIuLER, Nmv YORK CIVIL PRACTICE ir 3211.43
(1966).
'954 Misc. 2d 405, 282 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1967).
70 Id. at 406, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
717B MCKIINNEY'S CPLR 3211, commentary 320, 321 (1963).
72 7B MCICINNEY'S CPLR 3211, legislative studies and reports, 327, 329
(1963).
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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

suggested that the omnibus-motion approach of CPLR 3211(e)
is not overridden by the compromise with respect to 3211(a) (7)
and, therefore, motions pursuant to 3211(a) (7) should be made at
the time other 3211(a) motions are made. Consequently, it is
submitted that "any subsequent time" should be construed to mean
any subsequent time after answer.
CPLR 3215: One year period in third-party action runs from
judgment against third-party plaintiff in main action.
In Multari v. Glalin Arns Corp.,73 a wrongful death action,
the defendant, an owner and general contractor, served a thirdparty summons and complaint for contractual and implied indemnification on Krugman Construction Corporation (Krugman),
the deceased's employer. Since Krugman had not yet answered
one month prior to the trial the defendant advised Krugman to
notify its insurance carrier about the impending trial, and enclosed
certain pleadings, but Krugman did not appear. Shortly before
the trial, Krugman was given notice of its default but this notice
was also ignored.
Subsequent to a judgment rendered against the defendant for
failure to provide plaintiff with a safe place to work, the court
granted a default judgment to defendant against Krugman, based
on the negligent manner in which it covered the opening through
which plaintiff fell.
On motion in supreme court, special term, the default was
vacated"7 on the ground that CPA § 193 (a), in effect when the
third-party complaint was served, did not require Krugman to
answer the third-party complaint.7 ' The court allowed the thirdparty plaintiff to serve a supplemental complaint, to which Krugman was directed to answer, indicating that a new trial was
necessary to resolve the issue of indemnity.
Reversing, the appellate division, second department, held, that
the third-party answer, despite the statutory words "may answer,"
was mandatory under
CPA § 193(a) and reinstated the original
76
default judgment.
The appellate division was then presented with the contention
tfiat the default judgment was invalid since it had been entered
more than three years after the third-party complaint was served.
CPLR 3215(c) provides that if judgment is not entered within
App. Div. 2d 122, 282 N.Y.S.2d 782 (2d Dep't 1967).
7451 Misc. 2d 1019, 274 N.Y.S2d 827 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1966).
7 CPA § 193(a) stated that the third-party defendant "may answer"
the third-party complaint. Contrast with this the mandatory wording of
CPLR 1008, "[tihe third-party defendant shall answer the [third-party]
claim. . . "
71Multari v. Glalin Arms Corp., 28 App. Div. 2d 122, 282 N.Y.S.2d
7328

782 (2d Dep't 1967).

